I. Introduction
In the 1970s, commercial bank faced restrictions on interest rates, both on the deposit and lending sides of their business. They were restricted for the most part to classic financial intermediation -deposit taking and lending -to the exclusion, for example, of underwriting many corporate securities and insurance products. And, banks were limited in the geographical scope of their operations. No state permitted banks headquartered in other states either to open branches or to buy their banks, and many states prohibited or restricted intrastate branching.
Today, almost all of these restrictions have been lifted. Interest rate ceilings on deposits were phased out in the early 1980s, state usury laws have been weakened because banks may now lend anywhere, limits to banks' ability to engage in other financial activities have been almost completely eliminated, as have restrictions on the geographical scope of banking. As a result, our banking system is now more competitive and more consolidated than ever -both vertically and horizontally. This paper focuses on how one dimension of this broad-based deregulation -the removal of limits on bank entry and expansion -affected economic performance. In a nutshell, the results suggest that this regulatory change was followed by better performance of the real economy. State economies grew faster and had higher rates of new business formation after this deregulation. At the same time, macroeconomic stability improved. By opening up markets and allowing the banking system to integrate across the nation, deregulation made local economies less sensitive to the fortunes of their local banks.
Below I explain first how relaxation of geographical restrictions on bank expansion proceeded historically, and why our somewhat unusual history of state-level regulation and deregulation presents an attractive setting to study how the financial system affects the real economy. I then present the evidence that banking deregulation led to substantial and beneficial real effects on our economy. The findings are important for at least two reasons. First, they demonstrate the tight link between "Wall Street" and "Main Street." Finance is not only affected by the fortunes of the industrial sector, but the reverse holds true as well. This mutual dependence highlights the importance of financial regulation not only here in the United States but, perhaps even more critically, in emerging economies without a well developed set of financial markets and institutions. Second, the results support the idea that competition and financial market openness are beneficial. This finding would be accepted as non-controversial when applied to industrial firms -for most economist, free trade and competition are akin to motherhood -but is much less accepted when applied to the financial sector.
II. Bank Deregulation as an Empirical Laboratory
The evolutionary history of banking regulations in the United States offers researchers a unique opportunity to study the effects deregulation, particularly those related to restrictions on banks' ability to expand within and across state lines, because they were imposed at the state level and because states changed their regulatory restrictions on expansion at different times.
Although there was some deregulation of branching restrictions in the 1930s, most states either prohibited branching altogether (the "unit banking" states) or limited branching into the 1970s.
At that point, only twelve states allowed unrestricted statewide branching. Between 1970 and 1994, however, 38 states deregulated their restrictions on branching. The staggered timing of state-level moves to deregulate both branching and interstate banking restrictions provides an ideal laboratory to explore empirically how these regulatory changes affected banking and the real economy. Because of the cross-state and over-time variation in the regulatory status of different states, both unobserved state differences and aggregate shocks (and any secular trends) can be fully absorbed with the inclusion of fixed effects, while leaving sufficient variation in the regulatory variables to estimate their effects on state-level financial and real variables. Moreover, by using the state as the relevant unit, the resulting panel data set is balanced because states do not enter or exit the sample. Thus, there is no need to worry about (or attempt to correct for) survivorship biases that can plague attempts to draw inferences from bank-level or firm-level data.
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To be concrete, the research method boils down to estimating a regression using stateyear observations with the following structure:
(1) Y st = " t + $ s + ( 1 Branch st + ( 2 Bank st + OtherControls st + , st where s indexes states, t indexes time, Y st is the dependent variable of interest, " t is a yearspecific fixed effect (estimated by including a set of year indicator variables), $ s is a statespecific fixed effect (estimated by including a set of state indicator variables), Branch st is an indicator set to one after a state permits branching (by means of merger and acquisition), and Bank st is an ind icator set to one after a state permits interstate banking. Thus, the deregulation indicators equal one in all state-years following deregulation, and they equal zero in all stateyears prior to deregulation. (Kane, 1996) .
More broadly, Economides, Hubbard and Palia (1996) show that small banks lobbied successfully in the 1930s for both generous deposit insurance and tight limits on branching, despite the objections of large banks. White (1998) shows that the small bank lobby continued its success over the subsequent 40 years by gaining increased levels of deposit insurance coverage all the way up until 1980 when this limit was last raised (to $100,000). 4 Thus, the influence of small banks may explain the relative stability of these regulatory institutions from the 1930s through the 1970s. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) suggest that the emergence of new technologies in both deposit-taking and lending beginning in the 1970s tipped the balance in the political arena from the traditional beneficiaries of geographical restrictions -small banks -toward more expansion-minded, large banks. As evidence, we show that deregulation occurred earlier in states with fewer small banks, in states where small banks were financially weak, and in states with more small and bank-dependent firms. We also find that a larger insurance industry delayed deregulation when banks could compete in the sale of insurance products. Interest group factors related to the relative strength of potential winners (large banks and small firms) and losers (small banks and the rival insurance firms) therefore can explain the timing of branching deregulation across states.
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Given these political economy explanations for banking reform, can we interpret the results from equation (1)? The results in Kroszner and Strahan (1999) how a state's banking structure changes after it deregulates, on how its growth performance 5 We also find that the same interest group variables also can explain the voting patterns of legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives on interstate banking deregulation and deposit insurance reform (See Kroszner and Strahan, 2000) . changes relative to its level before deregulation, and on how the volatility of its busine ss cycle changes, again relative to its volatility prior to regulatory change.
III. How Banking Changed after Deregulation
We can only expect deregulation to have had large effects on the real economy if there were important changes in the structure and efficiency of the banking industry resulting from the reforms. To summarize briefly the key changes, relaxing restrictions on bank expansion led to larger banks operating across a wider geographical area. Increases in local market concentration, however, did not occur. This makes sense because the restrictions on branching and interstate banking generally did not apply to local markets, with the exception of a few "unit banking"
states that did not permit branching in any form. Thus, deregulation led banks to enter new markets, but it did not spur banks to consolidate within a local market. Table 2 documents very briefly the magnitude of some of these changes. Here, I report the estimated coefficients on the within-state branching indicator (Branch st ) and the interstate banking indicator (Bank st ) from the fixed effects model described in equation (1) above. In column (1), the dependent variable equals the acquisition rate in a state-year, defined as the total dollar value of assets in banks acquired during the state-year, divided by total banking assets in the state at the beginning of the year. 7 The results suggest, as expected, that acquisitions increased sharply following interstate banking deregulation. The coefficient implies that the annual acquisition rate rose by 1.64 percentage points after interstate reform --quite a large jump relative to the unconditional mean of 2.77 percent. In contrast, there was no significant increase in bank acquisitions following branching deregulation. Banks tended to expand by purchasing branches of existing banks after branching reform rather than by acquiring all of the branches and other assets of whole banks, so the acquisition rate of whole banks did not rise (for details, see Stiroh and Strahan, forthcoming) .
The second column of Table 2 shows that local market concentration did not increase following deregulation despite the increased acquisition activity; if anything, there was a slight drop following interstate banking reform. This bank's market share (measured in percentage terms) would equal the sum of all of its deposits in those 10 branches, divided by the total deposits held in by all bank branches within that MSA, times 100. For a market with a single bank owning all of the branches, the HHI would equal 10,000, whereas in a perfectly atomistic market the HHI would approach zero.
The last three columns of Table 2 show that the market share of small banks declined following both branching and interstate banking reform. The declines were most prono unced following branching deregulation. For example, the share of assets held by banks with less than $50 million in assets (in 1994 dollars) fell by 1.6 percentage points (relative to a mean of 8.9
acquisitions. But if two banks owned by the same holding company merged, these assets would not be counted.
percent), the share of assets held by banks with assets between $50 and $100 million fell by 2.0 percentage points (relative to a mean of 10.3 percent), and the share held by banks with assets between $100 and $500 million fell by 2.2 percentage points (relative to a mean of 23.2 percent).
After interstate banking the share of the smallest banks declined, while the share of other banks did not change significantly.
Did these structural changes cause meaningful changes in the efficiency of a state's banking industry? In earlier research, Jayaratne and Strahan (1998) report that the banking industry became significantly more efficient following reform. They find that non-interest costs fell, that wages fell, and that loan losses fell after states deregulated branching. These cost reductions led, in turn, to lo wer prices on loans (although not on deposits). The mechanism for this better performance seems to be changes in the market shares of banks following deregulation. Prior to regulatory reform, well-run banks faced binding constraints on the markets in which they could operate. When these constraints were lifted, however, assets moved toward the better run banks as they gained the opportunity to acquire market share.
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The beneficial dynamic effects of competition following deregulation can be seen graphically in three figures reported below. 10 In Figure 1 , we simply plot the correlation between a bank's profit rate (return on equity) and its subsequent asset growth. We find that this correlation is low during the late 1970s, when the better banks were constrained by regulations, then rose sharply during the period of regulatory change -the period when better banks were gobbling up market share -then fell back during the beginning of the 1990s. The figure illustrates, somewhat crudely, the dynamic effects of deregulation. 
IV. The Real Effects of Deregulation
Did the beneficial changes in banking have quantitatively important effects on the real economy? The answer to this question is important not only for helping us gain an understanding of what has happened in the United States, but also for considering how banking systems across the world ought to be structured and regulated. In recent years, a growing number of researchers have studied how different financial regulatory regimes across countries affected financial stability and economic performance. For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) test how differences in financial development and banking structure affected growth across different industries. Demirguc-Kunt, Levine and Min (1999) find that countries open to foreign entry have had better performing banks. 
Growth Effects
In the early Twentieth Century, Joseph Schumpeter (1969) argued that efficient financial systems promote innovations; hence, better finance leads to faster growth. On the other hand, Joan Robinson (1952) believed that the causality was reversed; economies with good growth prospects develop institutions to provide the funds necessary to support those good prospects. In other words, the economy leads and finance follows. Recent theoretical developments have fleshed out two potential causal links from financial systems to growth. Financial markets can matter either by affecting the volume of savings available to finance investment or by increasing the productivity (or quality) of that investment. These theories show that an improvement in financial market efficiency can act as a lubricant to the engine of economic growth, allowing that engine to run faster.
Empirical research in recent years has increasingly provided support for the Schumpterian view that financial market development can play an important causal role in driving long-run growth. For example, King and Levine (1993) demonstrated that the size and depth of an economy's financial system is positively correlated with its future growth in percapita, real income. While this evidence is suggestive, it can not rule out the possibility that financial development and growth are simultaneously driven by a common factor not controlled in the empirical analysis. Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) attempt to answer this criticism by exploiting cross-industry differences in financial dependence. They
show that in countries with well-developed financial markets, industries that require more external finance grow faster than "cash cow" industries that can finance investment with internally generated funds. Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) attempt to establish a causal link from finance to growth by using pre-existing legal differences across countries as instruments for the development of the banking system; they show that the exogenous component of banking development is positively related to growth performance.
Another way to establish that better finance (or, specifically, better banking) can lead to faster growth is to find policy changes that lead to more efficient finance (banking) and see how the economy responds. In earlier work, Jith Jayaratne and I did just this. 11 We showed that improvements in the financial markets can spur faster economic growth by studying state-level branch banking deregulation. Using data from 1972 to 1992, we estimated the change in economic performance before and after deregulation and found that annual growth rates accelerated by one-half to one percentage point. In that study, we worked hard to rule out other interpretations of the finding. For example, we showed that states did not deregulate their economies in anticipation of future good growth prospects. We also found no other concomitant policy changes that could account for the result, and no consistent political changes, such as a change in the party controlling the state government, around the time of deregulation.
Below, I re-estimate this growth model using a slightly different sample period (1976 to 1996) and including some additional control variables. Before turning to the results, Table 3 reports summary statistics for the growth measure, equal to the real annual growth rate in percapita state-level personal income. 12 The personal income data are reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and converted to constant dollars using the Consumer Price Index. Over the sample period, real personal income grew at an annual rate of slightly less than 1.5 percent. The standard deviation of the growth rates equals 2.79 percent, with a minimum of about -15 percent in North Dakota in 1980, and a maximum of about +17 percent, again in North Dakota in 1978.
Overall there is clearly more variability in year-to-year growth rates for small states like North Dakota, but in Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) we were careful to rule out the possibility that the growth increases were driven by a few of these small states. In the interest of brevity, I will not report these tests here.
13 Table 4 reports the results of the growth regressions, which include the two banking reform indicator variables, the state and time fixed effects, and a set of variables controlling for the share of employment in each state coming from eight one-digit SIC industries. These share variables account for the possibility that different sectors exhibit different levels of average growth.
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The results in column (1) Column (2) tests whether these growth effects were long lasting or just temporary surges following the regulatory change. Here, I add an indicator variable equal to one starting five years after branching reform. If the growth effects were temporary, this additional indicator would have negative and statistically significant coefficient. (The long-run effect being estimated by the sum of the two coefficients.) Since this additional variable does not enter the regression with a significant effect, the evidence suggests that the growth effects are permanent.
13 Specifically, we showed that the results remain significant using a weighted least squares model, where the weights were proportional to state size. In addition, we showed that among the 35 states that deregulated their branching restrictions after 1972, all but 6 experienced an increase in growth after the regulatory changes relative to before. 14 In the regressions the shares sum to one, so one of the eight groups must be omitted. In all regressions, the omitted category is the share of employment in the government sector. Hence, all of the coefficients measure the effect of increasing the employment share in the sector relative to the government sector. 15 Because most states permitted interstate banking during the middle of the 1980s, there is much less variation to exploit in the regressions once state and year fixed effects are included. Hence, the standard error of the interstate banking indicator tends to be larger than the standard error on the branching reform indicator.
Of course, the amount of time that has elapsed since the end of the deregulatory phase has not been long -less than ten years in this data set -so these conclusions must be made cautiously.
In the last two columns of Table 4 , I introduce the employment share variables. These results suggest that mining, construction, manufacturing and perhaps transportation are associated with relatively faster growth than the other sectors. Most important for the purposes here, however, is that the conclusions remain the same. The effect of branching deregulation gets somewhat larger when the share variables are added to the model. Moreover, the indicator equal to one during the years starting five years after reform becomes positive, although as before we can not reject the hypothesis that its coefficient equals zero.
Effects on Entrepreneurs
The results so far suggest that growth accelerated after deregulation. But following the logic of Rajan and Zingales, just as cash-constrained firms benefited most from financial development, bank-dependent firms ought to have benefited the most from the banking deregulation and associated improvements in finance. Entrepreneurs or potential entrepreneurs are likely to be highly dependent on banks and other financial markets because they have not had the opportunity (yet) to generate cash flow that can support investment. Indeed, Schumpeter himself emphasized the role of financial markets in getting funds to young firms as a key channel through which finance can affect long-run growth. To test this idea, I now explore how the level and growth in new business formation changes following banking reform. As a further check on the data, incorporations per capita and starts per capita can be compared with the number of new establishments per capita, which is available from the Small Business Administration starting in 1989. 18 An establishment is not a firm; rather, it is an economic unit that employs people, such as a plant, a factory, or a restaurant. Nevertheless, we think that the number of new establishments ought to be highly correlated with the economic 16 In an earlier paper I explore how differences in banking structure across states affects new business formation. See Black and Strahan (2002) . quantity that we are trying to observe -the rate of creation of new businesses. Again, it is highly correlated with both incorporations and starts. From 1989 to 1994, the cross-state correlation between incorporations and new establishments ranges from 0.52 to 0.57, and cross-state correlation between starts and new establishments ranges from 0.41 to 0.65. Thus, new incorporations in a state seem to capture new business formation. Table 3 reports summary statistics for both the level of new incorporations per capita and for its annual growth rate. In a typical state and year, there are about 2.5 new incorporations formed for every 1000 people living in a state. The mean growth rate is 2.06 percent per year, slightly higher than the growth in real per-capita income. Notice that the variation in the growth of new incorporations is about four times higher than the varia tion of overall income. Table 5 reports how entrepreneurial activity changed following banking deregulation using the new incorporations data. (Note that in the levels regression, I use the logarithm of the rate of new businesses per capita so that the coefficient may be interpreted in percentage terms.) Consistent with the Schumpterian logic, both the level and growth of entrepreneurial activity increased following banking deregulation. The regression coefficients suggest, for example, that the annual level of new incorporations per-capita increased by 9.8 percent after branching deregulation, and by 5.7 percent after interstate banking reform (column 2). In the specifications using the growth rate, the increase only occurred following deregulation of branching. Thus, the effects on entrepreneurial activity of branching deregulation appear to be larger and more persistent than the effects of interstate banking, consistent with the effects of the two reforms on personal income growth. It is also worth noting that the magnitude of the increase in the growth of new incorporations is substantially larger than the increase in personal income growth following reform, although the standard errors are also substantially larger due to the greater variation in this series.
Business Cycle Effects
The evidence so far points to substantial benefits of opening up banking markets to potential entry and greater competition, for entrepreneurs looking to start businesses and, perhaps through their efforts, to faster overall economic growth. Cross country evidence is beginning to emerge suggesting that opening up financial markets to foreign entry can also create benefits associated with macroeconomic stability (Barth, Caprio and Levine, 2002) . There is some evidence from studies at the bank level, however, that risk-taking may increase with the reductions in franchise value that come following banking deregulation (Keeley, 1990 , Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan, 1996 , Hellman, Murdock and Stiglitz, 2000 , Bergstresser, 2001 ).
How did banking reform in the U.S. affect macroeconomic stability? In a recent paper, Morgan, Rime and Strahan (2002) analyze this question from both a theoretical and an empirical standpoint. We show first that following interstate banking deregulation in the United States, the banking system became substantially better integrated nationally. Prior to deregulation, the U.S. had a balkanized system composed effectively of 50 little banking systems, one for each state.
After interstate deregulation, however, an average of about 60 percent of a state's banking assets were owned by a multi-state (or, sometimes multinational) banking company. The theoretical effect of this banking integration on business cycles, however, is ambiguous. In Morgan et al, we start with a banking model in which bankers can prevent moral hazard-by monitoring firms-and they can commit moral hazard-by neglecting to monitor. These hazards make the equilibrium rate of investment in the economy depend on the level of firm collateral and bank capital; these state variables give firms and bankers a stake in future investment outcomes, but shocks to either variable cause equilibrium investment to fall, i.e., collateral crunches and bank capital crunches are both contractionary.
We then show how integration of banking -that is, linking up the banking systems of two formerly separate economies -changes the effects of these two kinds of shocks. It turns out that both collateral and capital shocks remain contractionary after integration, but their magnitudes change: bank capital shocks become less important after integration, but the effects of collateral shocks gets bigger. The intuition for this result is straightforward and general. A banking company that is diversified across two economies can import capital if lending opportunities in one economy are strong relative to the availability of local bank capital. In contrast, a collateral shock in one economy will lead the integrated bank to export their capital and lending, thus worsening the resulting downturn. Table 6 below quantifies empirically how both branching and interstate banking deregulation affected the magnitude of state business cycles. The dependent variable in these regressions equals the absolute value of the residuals from the personal income growth regressions (Table 4 , columns 1 and 3), and the growth in new incorporations regressions (Table   5 , columns 3 and 4). Thus, the dependent variables in Table 6 can be thought of as the magnitude of the deviation from expected growth in state personal income and new businesses, conditional on the employment shares in a state, the state's average growth rate (the state fixed effect), and shocks to the U.S. economy as a whole (the year fixed effects).
The results suggest that overall state-level business cycle volatility fell after interstate banking and the associated financial integration. The coefficients suggest a decline of 0.31 to 0.47 percentage points, which is large relative to the unconditional mean of 1.26 percent (columns 1 and 2). The effects of branching deregulation are not significant, although this should perhaps not be too surprising because branching deregulation allowed integration within a state rather than across state lines. 19 The results for the volatility of the growth of new incorporations also point in the same direction -toward less volatility following deregulationalthough the coefficients on both deregulation indicators are not significant at conventional levels (columns 3 and 4).
The theoretical analysis suggests that the explanation for better macroeconomic stability following deregulation is better insulation of a state's economy against shocks to its own banking system. In a disintegrated banking system, like the one we had in the 1970s and early 1980s, shocks to bank capital lead to reductions in lending, thereby worsening the downturn. In contrast, with integration a state can import bank capital from abroad (i.e. from other states) when its banks are down. If this explanation really holds, then the correlation between economic performance and banking performance ought to weaken with deregulation and integration. Table 7 puts this notion to the test by adding the growth rate of local bank capital to the personal income and incorporations growth regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5 
V. Conclusions
Banking deregulation of restrictions on branching and interstate banking lifted a set of constraints that had prevented better-run banks from gaining ground over their less efficient rivals. Big changes in the banking industry followed deregulation: many acquisitions and consolidation, integration across state lines, and a decline in the market share of small banks.
These changes allowed banks to offer better services to their customers at lower prices. As a result, the real economy -"Main Street" as it were -seems to have benefited. Overall economic growth accelerated following deregulation, and this faster growth seems to have been concentrated among new businesses. Sometimes we think that higher returns necessarily bring higher risk. But in the case of banking deregulation, volatility of the economy declined as growth went up. The acquisition rate is the dollar value of assets acquired during the state-year divided by beginning of period assets in the state-year. The local deposit HHI is the sum of squared market shares for all banking organizations operating within a local market, defined as a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). For states with multiple MSAs, we average the HHI across MSAs within the state weighted by the amount of deposits in the MSA. The model is estimated using a fixed effects model with both year and state effects. The year of deregulation is dropped. Also, South Dakota and Delaware are dropped. *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. These regressions are estimated using a fixed effects model with both year and state effects. The year of deregulation is dropped. Also, South Dakota and Delaware are dropped. *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The volatility equals the absolute deviation in the growth rate from its expected value; that is, the absolute value of the residuals from the models reported in Tables 4 and 5 . These regressions are estimated using a fixed effects model with both year and state effects. The year of deregulation is dropped. Also, South Dakota and Delaware are dropped. *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. These regressions are estimated using a fixed effects model with both year and state effects. The year of deregulation is dropped. Also, South Dakota and Delaware are dropped. *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Sample ends in 1994 because the capital growth variable can not be constructed at the state level accurately after than time.
